Libya Special Report

Concentric evaluates Libya as a geopolitically critical yet highly fragmented country, where competing governments in the east and west follow distinct approaches to reconstruction and security. Eastern Libya is witnessing significant infrastructure development supported by notable foreign investment, while similar projects are underway in the western region. Despite signs of economic revival, security risks from terrorism, criminal networks, and armed groups remain high, necessitating rigorous due diligence and security risk mitigation for international business engagement.

OVERVIEW

Libya’s persistent fragmentation and slow reconstruction process have created risks and opportunities for businesses looking to expand in the region. While the country remains politically divided and security-fragile, the eastern region, particularly Benghazi, has emerged as a focal point for internationally supported infrastructure renewal. Since 2011, Libya entered a protracted phase of armed conflict, factionalism, and institutional collapse. Competing governments, warlord factions, and international actors have vied for control over the country’s strategic assets, including oil fields, ports, and airports. Libya occupies a pivotal position in North Africa with significant regional influence.

RECENT DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

EASTERN LIBYA

East Libya, governed by the Government of National Stability (GNS), and supported militarily by the Libyan National Army (LNA), has seen the most coherent infrastructure planning and execution in recent years. Under the leadership of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, eastern authorities have pursued a policy of consolidating control through visible reconstruction and high-profile projects.

• Airport Projects:

• Benina International Airport (Benghazi): Now operational following years of closure due to militia conflict, Benina Airport has resumed international and domestic connectivity. Although older and limited in capacity, it remains a crucial hub for travel into the east. Flights connect Benghazi to Istanbul, Alexandria, Tunis, and increasingly, to Gulf states.

• New Benghazi International Airport (Tika Airfield Project): Perhaps the most ambitious aviation development in Libya to date, this project aims to transform a disused aviation club into the largest air transit facility in North Africa. With a projected capacity of 15 million passengers annually, the airport is being constructed by the Emirati-backed Global Builders Company in partnership with the National Development Agency (NDA) of the GNS. A 3.8 km runway and modern passenger terminal are already in early phases of construction, with the aim of replacing Benina as eastern Libya’s main international air hub.

• Port Redevelopment in Tobruk and Derna: Eastern authorities have announced a multi-phase redevelopment plan to improve port access and increase cargo handling capacity. These ports serve domestic trade and regional transit to Egypt, and are expected to become critical nodes in Libya’s energy export network.

• Egyptian Investment: Egypt remains one of the most active state investors in eastern Libya, with construction and energy companies increasingly involved in contracts issued by LNA-affiliated institutions. Cairo’s involvement offers eastern Libya both material capacity and regional political cover.

Map represents the major airports and port facilities in Eastern Libya.

WESTERN LIBYA

West Libya, governed by the U.N.-recognized Government of National Unity (GNU) based in Tripoli, faces greater complications due to internal militia politics and fragmented control, yet it remains economically vital and is beginning to attract targeted foreign investment.

• Airport Projects:

• Tripoli’s Mitiga International Airport: Tripoli’s Mitiga Airport serves as the primary air gateway for commercial activity but remains under militia-influenced security. Companies retain interest regarding the airport, although Mitiga is often impacted by political unrest.

• Tripoli Airport: The GNU announced a memorandum of understanding with Turkish company, “Terminal Yapi” and British company, “IRG International” to finance a new Tripoli airport project. 

• Urban Redevelopment in Tripoli and Misrata: Turkish firms have launched or resumed various housing, roadwork, and hospital construction projects in the region. These projects are often tied to political deals between the GNU and Turkey, including military support agreements in exchange for long-term economic concessions.

Power and Energy Infrastructure: Italian and Turkish companies in particular, such as ENI and Tekfen Construction, have resumed work on electrical grid stabilization, fuel storage, and refining capacity upgrades in western Libya. The area around Zawiya and Sabratha remains a key focus due to proximity to oil infrastructure.

• Port of Misrata Expansion: The Misrata Free Zone Authority continues in its modernization efforts, with investment from Qatar, Chinese and Turkish logistics firms. Misrata is positioning itself as a commercial counterweight to Benghazi and is home to one of Libya’s more disciplined local security forces.

Map represents the major airports and port facilities in Western Libya.

VOLATILE SECURITY SITUATION

Despite visible progress, the security environment in Libya remains volatile and poses a number of challenges for international personnel and operations. Libya remains divided between two rival governments with the internationally recognized GNU controlling Tripoli and the west, and the LNA-backed GNS operating in the east. National institutions may not recognize infrastructure agreements in the east, complicating legal standing, insurance, and risk exposure.

EASTERN LIBYA

East Libya, particularly Benghazi and surrounding areas, is under the de facto control of the LNA, led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. While the region is nominally governed by the GNS, political and security authority is centralized under the LNA, which exercises tight control over institutions, strategic assets, and civil administration. This militarized governance structure has reduced inter-militia warfare but has introduced authoritarian practices including arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances, and tight surveillance of political dissent. For example, in November 2024, Libyan forces rescued seven Pakistan nationals who were abducted in Derna.

• Although large-scale terrorist activity has diminished, the region remains vulnerable to infiltration by extremist actors, particularly through desert corridors near Kufra, the southern Fezzan, and border zones with Sudan and Chad. Eastern Libya also serves as a base for foreign mercenary groups, including elements of the Wagner Group, further complicating the security environment and raising the risk of international entanglement. 

WESTERN LIBYA

Western Libya, particularly Tripoli, has governance and security functions dominated by competing militias. While nominally under the control of the GNU, Tripoli is divided among powerful groups such as the Stability Support Apparatus (SSA), RADA (Special Deterrence Force), the 444 Brigade, and others. The factions maintain parallel chains of command, control strategic infrastructure (airports, ministries, ports), and regularly compete over territory and resources. In addition, large-scale ISIS and al-Qaeda operations have reduced but sleeper cells and sympathizers remain in western Libya, especially in outlying rural areas and trans-Sahel corridors. Militants take advantage of weak border enforcement along routes connecting Jufra, Sabha, and Zuwara, blending with smuggling and migrant networks.

• Recent security incidents include:

• July 2025: A police officer from Al-Ajilat was fatally shot during a protest, escalating into violence. 

• July 2025: The GNU announced plans to conduct airstrikes on organized crime groups involved in human and narcotics trafficking. 

• December 2024: Clashes occurred between armed groups, trapping residents and causing a fire at the second largest oil refinery. 

• August 2023: Armed clashes erupted with minimal warning which killed over 50 and led to the shutdown of Mitiga International Airport.

Libya’s western borders with Tunisia and Algeria are porous and largely controlled by tribal, militant, or criminal groups. The Ras Ajdir crossing, in particular, has been closed and reopened multiple times amid clashes between rival western Libyan militias.

• Smuggling networks moving fuel, migrants, and weapons often overlap with state-aligned actors, particularly in Zuwara, Nalut, and Sabratha. This dynamic complicates law enforcement and reduces visibility into local risks.

• For cross-border operations, companies should anticipate logistical delays, exposure to corruption, and the possibility of targeted attacks or thefts by non-state actors.

OUTLOOK AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Looking ahead, the security environment in Libya remains highly volatile, prompting the U.S. State Department to maintain its Level 4 – Do Not Travel advisory, citing crime, terrorism, unexploded landmines, civil unrest, kidnapping, and armed conflict. International businesses and travelers should approach Libya with heightened caution, avoiding high-risk areas and maintaining constant situational awareness. 

• Prior to travel, it is critical to conduct comprehensive risk assessments, secure localized intelligence on political, criminal, and infrastructure-related risks, and coordinate movements with trusted local contacts or authorities. 

• Private security support is also strongly advised for personal safety and logistical coordination. Travelers should maintain a discreet profile, limit movements during evening hours, and ensure reliable, pre-vetted transportation is used at all times. 

• Travel tracking tools and secure communication channels should be employed so movements are monitored in real time by a designated security contact.